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Political Education and the
History of Political Thought
DANIEL R. SABIA, JR.
University of South Carolina
Texts designed to introduce political science students to the history of political thought or to past
political theories have been commonplace in the discipline, as have disputes about their pedagogical
utility or justifiability, and methodological debates concerning their adequacy or legitimacy. In an
effort to address these disputes and some of these debates, I construct three models of historiographical inquiry. Each model represents a particular approach, and each is defined in terms of three
common features. The methodological debates are joined both indirectly and directly: indirectly by
identifying clearly the majorfeatures and purposes of these approaches, and directly by consideration
of such issues as the nature of a historical tradition, the legitimacy of certain interpretive strategies
and presuppositions, and the viability of certain conceptions of past political theory. I conclude that
each approach can make significant contributions to the education of political science students.

Texts that examine the history of political
thought "from ancient to modern times" or focus
on political theories "from Plato to Marx" have
been widely used in courses dealing with these
topics since at least the turn of the century.
Typically designed only to provide an introduction to the subject matter, these studies combine
original research with secondary scholarship in a
variety of formats emphasizing sometimes divergent perspectives and pedagogical concerns.
Despite this diversity, the authors of these texts all
agree on one point: the study of Western political
thought provides one of the foundations of a
sound education in political science.
The central purpose of this article is to reconfirm that a familiarity with the history of political
thought can contribute to political education in
two main ways: it can develop in students the historical knowledge, and especially the historical
sense, necessary to an adequate understanding of
political study and political life, and it can help to
cultivate in students the ability to think systematically, analytically, creatively, and critically
about political ideas, practices, and problems.
These essentially instrumental arguments will
be developed by analyzing and defending precisely
those texts that have presupposed their cogency.
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One advantage of this somewhat indirect strategy
is that it will allow me to contribute to some of the
recent methodological debates about this literature,' even though my primary aim is to defend
the study of past political thought and theory
against a series of longstanding criticisms. There
have always been, and there are today, at least
some political scientists who question the utility,
necessity, or desirability of the study of political
thought and its history. One objection concerns
the relationship between political philosophy and
political science. According to this view, political
science is (or should be) a purely scientific discipline, and neither political philosophy nor that
part of it concerned with past political theories
has much to offer the student or scholar. Especially prevalent during the rise of behavioralism,
this argument reflects the position that political
philosophy is a normative (and hence irrelevant)
enterprise and that past theories are, as well, both
ideological and outdated. The conclusion is that
interest in the history of theory is not merely a
waste of intellectual energy but a veritable obstacle to political education and to the development
of modern scientific political theory.2
'I refer to the methodological discussion and debates
launched in the 1960s by Pocock (1962), Dunn (1968),
and Skinner (1969). Representative discussions include
Sanderson (1968), Leslie (1970), Pocock (1971, 1980),
Skinner (1972, 1974), Tarlton (1973), Schochet (1974),
Wiener (1974), Ashcraft (1975, 1980), Gunnell (1978,
1979), and Tarcov (1982).
'Advocates of both the new science movement in the
1920s, and of behavioralism in the 1950s and 1960s,
adopted these and related positions. Examples of the
former include Charles Merriam, George Catlin, and
William Bennett Munro; of the latter, Harold Lasswell,
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A second common objection is that those political scientists specializing in political philosophy or
theory are (or are in constant danger of becoming)
antiquarians, that the study of past thought ought
to be a secondary or tertiary activity rather than a
full-time occupation or obsession. According to
this argument, in other words, students and scholars of political philosophy do little except study,
reinterpret, and debate past ideas and theories,
whereas they should be concerned with the construction and criticism of current political ideas
and theories.3
Albeit for different reasons, these two objections are opposed to the attention paid to past
theories. Both would like to see those political
scientists specializing in political philosophy
redirect their energies to certain present-day
endeavors: in one case, to the work needed for the
development of empirical theories; in the other, to
the development of normative theories. By contrast, a third objection opposes, not the study of
past thought per se, but a particular type of study
often termed the historicist or historical kind.
This kind of study is characterized by its focus on
distinctively historical questions, and it is for this
reason condemned as irrelevant to the student of
politics. According to the argument, historicist
studies are indefensible because they miss the
main point, which is to utilize the study of past
thought for present-day purposes.4
A compelling response to these objections
would demonstrate that exposure to the history of
political thought is virtually indispensable to the
education of political science students and that
continued scholarship in this area must in consequence be encouraged and applauded. I intend to
provide such a response by defending the texts
mentioned above and hereafter referred to as

Robert Dahl, and, depending on how one interprets
him, David Easton. Lasswell's comments are typical: In
the recent past, said he, historians of political theory
"were so weighed down with the burden of genteel
erudition that they had little intellectual energy left with
Hence empirical
which to evolve original theory.
work in political science received a minimum of constructive aid from scholars formally responsible for
political theory" (Lasswell, 1954, p. 201).
3This position has been especially popular since the
1950s and has been articulated by, for example, J.
Roland Pennock, Alfred Cobban, Robert Dahl, David
Easton, and to some extent Richard Ashcraft.
4Prototypes of historicist studies were said to be the
works of Dunning, McIlwain, and Sabine, and were
condemned in the terms described by David Easton
(1953), Andrew Hacker (1954, 1961) and William
Bluhm (1962). Similar views were expressed earlier by
W. W. Willoughby; Leo Strauss also raised similar
complaints.
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"histories." The defense can be restricted in this
fashion because these histories have been specifically designed to acquaint students with past political thought or theory, have been traditionally justified on precisely the sort of instrumental
grounds I am seeking, and because they presuppose and embody the collective research of
scholars in the field.
An overview of these histories demonstrates
considerable variety; different authors have approached and presented the subject matter in different ways for different reasons. This circumstance requires the construction of models or ideal
types, each representing a fairly common approach to the writing of this sort of history. The
models are defined in terms of three features: the
subject matter included, called the "focus" of a
history; the central questions posed in a history,
called "primary objectives"; and underlying
assumptions, called "presuppositions," which
typically accompany given foci and objectives.
Based on these criteria, I depict and defend three
models. Of course, no actual history will be fully
characterized by any one of the models, and any
actual history will almost surely share some
features present in more than one model. But
because my primary interest is justificatory
(rather than descriptive), the simplicity of the
models presents no problem.
The Historical Model
The first model I define and defend is the historical model. Real-life approximations to it include the histories of Dunning (1902), Sabine
(1961), and Sibley (1970). The focus of this model
is broad, including all levels of political and social
thought from the popular to the philosophical.
Although interested in the exposition of political
ideas and theories, the primary objective of the
scholar adopting this model is to explain why
political ideas and theories appear when and
where they do, why they change over time, and
why (or whether) they have any influence on contemporaneous and subsequent thought and
behavior. These three objectives may be abbreviated as an inquiry into the historical genesis,
development, and influence of political thought in
the West.
The presuppositions that the historian brings to
this sort of history are as follows. First he assumes
that all forms of thought are embedded in historically specific "contexts" and, in particular,
that political ideas and theories "are produced as
a normal part of the social milieu in which politics
itself has its being" (Sabine, 1961, p. v). This presupposition is made for two reasons: first, it is
believed that the interpretation of past ideas and
theories requires knowledge of their associated
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contexts, because such contexts are assumed to
condition, determine, or otherwise provide clues
to: 1) the meanings (sense, reference, connotations) of specific terms and expressions and of the
conventions governing the application or use of
concepts, arguments, and methods of political
thinkers; 2) the identity and characteristics of tacit
assumptions and arguments made by thinkers;
and 3) the intentions or goals motivating thinkers.
In addition, it is supposed that knowledge of the
contexts of ideas and theories can help explain
their geneses. Particularly popular here have been
the contentions that ideas and theories constitute
responses both to perceived political problems or
crises and to the influences of partisan and intellectual contemporaries or predecessors.
These beliefs demonstrate a second presupposition of the model: the idea that the composition
of contexts is complex. In histories resembling the
model, it has been traditionally maintained that
the context of ideas and theories contains existential and ideational features. Political crises and
conflicts, major political events and trends, and
political institutions have been among the most
emphasized features of the existential component,
although general socioeconomic conditions and
trends, religious institutions and movements, and
many other variables have been included as well.
With respect to the ideational component, popular beliefs and norms, and the intellectual climate (including scientific, philosophical, and
religious theories, fashions, and beliefs) have been
most emphasized.
The complexity of contexts is underscored by
the additional assumption that they always contain a significant historical component. Specifically, it is assumed that many of the features constitutive of contexts are rooted in the pasts to
which, in turn, thinkers are linked. Persistent or
recurring controversies and conflicts, intellectual
and political traditions, and inherited prejudices
and practices are examples. It is partly because
contexts are assumed to include a historical
dimension that the question of influence arises.
Given the assumption, the historian tries to explain how political ideas and theories exert an influence on subsequent thought or practice and
thereby become agents of change, stabilizing elements within successive contexts, or both.
A final presupposition of the model is that contexts change over time and space. This assumption
guides, indeed underpins, the historian's account
of conceptual change and development. In those
histories that resemble the model, the identification and description of changing contexts are
typically used to help explain, in narrative
fashion, why and how "the political consciousness of men has passed from early antiquity to
modern times" through a series of "successive
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transformations" (Dunning, 1902, p. xviii), and
why the "reinterpretation and readaptation" of
received beliefs and theories have been one of the
characteristic chores of political thinkers (Sabine,
1961, p. 145). The idea of accounting for conceptual change and development by focusing on
changing contexts is also emphasized in monographs that resemble the historical model-as
when, for instance, an author seeks to tell "the
story" or how "the modern concept of the State
came to be formed" by "considering the historical development which prompted this conceptual change" (Skinner, 1978, pp. ix, x).
The interrelated focus, objectives, and presuppositions of this model constitute a coherent
historiographical approach to the writing of a history. My primary defense of histories resembling
the model will be that they are particularly well
suited to developing in students the historical
knowledge, and especially the historical sensibility, necessary to an adequate understanding of
both political study and political life. Although
this is my main contention, I also argue briefly
that these histories can encourage in students
creative and critical thinking. These arguments
are developed as I outline three specific themes or
hypotheses which one would expect to emerge,
and which in fact typically do emerge, from this
kind of history. The first of these is the theme of
diversity; the second a hypothesis asserting the interdependence of politics and political thought;
the third, the emphasis placed on the historical
character of the objects and methods of political
study.
An obvious and certainly common defense of
the "historical" history concerns the benefits provided by its emphasis on the diversity of political
thought and life. Once the historian commits himself to the suppositions that all forms of political
thought are to some extent context dependent and
that contexts change over time, his account of the
history of political thought will stress diversity.
This emphasis should awaken students to the
plurality of political ideas and ideals, perspectives
and theories, and of forms of political life. However we might judge Sabine's history, for example, a student cannot read it and then claim that
all persons and communities seek the same goods
or ends; that concepts such as democracy, freedom, and justice have either only one meaning or
always have the same meaning over time; that
there is but one way of studying politics, organizing political and social life, or justifying political
practices and principles.
An exposure to the diversity of political
thought and life can thus shake up preconceptions
and prejudices, liberating students from the tyranny of conventional modes of thinking. It can encourage creativity and critical thought by enlarg-
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ing the sense of the possible and undermining the
supposed certainty or "naturalness" of current
shibboleths and reifications. In other words, a
healthy sense of diversity can provide a counterbalance to intellectual smugness or ossification, a
sensitivity to the fact that virtually all political and
social concepts and ideals are problematic and
contested and can be exploited for different purposes by political ideologues, theorists, and scientists. Moreover, although this emphasis can help
students discern the provincial and modern in
contemporary institutional arrangements, ideologies, and theories, an exposure to the history of
Western political thought can demonstrate to
students that "truly novel ideas in the domains of
morals and politics are extremely rare" (Sibley,
1970, p. 7).
Although a healthy sense of the diversity of
political thought and of forms of political life is
encouraged by these histories, even more significant is the illumination provided by the hypothesis
that political thought and political life are interdependent, reflecting and constrained by one
another. The hypothesis is commonplace in such
histories: According to Dunning (1902, pp. 1-2),
for example, "the only path of approach to an
accurate apprehension of political [thought and]
philosophy is through political history"; and
Sabine (1961, p. v) similarly professed that his
study was written "in light of the hypothesis that
theories of politics are themselves a part of politics." The elaboration and defense of this
hypothesis produces a variety of claims which, I
want to argue, contribute in important ways to
political education.
One claim associated with the hypothesis is that
political thought is always to some extent conditioned and constrained by political and social
life. The existential problems addressed by thinkers, the ideas and ideals that they articulate and
defend or criticize, the institutions and behaviors
assumed or condemned, the alternatives propounded and possibilities foreseen-all these and
more are limited, to some extent even determined,
by the prevailing political arrangements, institutions, and conflicts within which thought takes
shape. Similarly, developments in political
thought seem often to follow developments in
political and social life as, for example, relatively
new ideas and ideals, and relatively novel perspectives on collective problems and possibilities, were
ushered in by the emergence and spread of the
Christian church and by the experience of modern
industrialization.
Historical knowledge of this sort, presented in
some detail in the historical history, is surely of
value to the student of politics. It has in the first
instance obvious intrinsic value because this historical knowledge is also political knowledge and,
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as sich, ought to be a part of political education,
but, in addition, the awareness that political
thought so often reflects and is limited by political
experience can alert students to the difficulty
political scientists confront whenever they seek to
develop transhistorical or transcultural knowledge
of political phenomena. In this way, it teaches not
merely humility and modesty; it underscores the
absolute necessity of historical knowledge for
those who would seek to generalize about politics.
A second and related claim associated with the
hypothesis is that political thought is often biased
by partisanship or socioeconomic position. By
locating thinkers within the political and social
context of which they were a part, the historian is
able to illustrate how political creeds and ideals
often reflect, promote, mask, or mystify political,
religious, or socioeconomic interests and arrangements such as prevailing distributions of power,
wealth, and privilege. Although presented in the
context of the history of political thought, this
sort of knowledge is obviously not limited to its
historical setting. The recognition that political
thought is typically connected to political interests
can help students understand and better assess
contemporary political rhetoric, partisan and
ideological conflict, and the attachment to particular positions, creeds, and symbols by political
groups and leaders. Further, the demonstration
that "many bodies of ideas can plausibly be interpreted, at least in part, as rationalizations of a
given status quo" can place the student "on guard
about one's own thinking and the degree to which
it can transcend the pressures of class, cultural,
and national interest" (Sibley, 1970, p. 6).
It is sometimes alleged that the historical histories do a disservice to students by making it appear as if political philosophy, like more popular
and partisan forms of thought, is historically conditioned, limited, and ideological. This allegation
is mistaken because exaggerated. In these histories
political philosophers are indeed said to produce
arguments and recommendations related to identifiable interests, groups, struggles, and crises
within specific societies, but there is at the same
time great reluctance to conclude that political
philosophy is reducible to ideology or partisan
pleading. Consider, as a relevant illustration,
Sabine's Hobbes. Examining Hobbes's work in
the political context of the English civil wars,
Sabine argues (what is now controversial) that one
of Hobbes's purposes was to defend not just royal
absolutism, but "the royalist party and . . . the
pretensions of the Stuarts" (1961, p. 456). At the
same time, however, Sabine demonstrates that
Hobbes's political persuasion and alleged political
interests hardly exhaust what he was about and
what he produced. He does this by relating
Hobbes's intentions and products to a much
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through with relentless logic is the true measure
widersocial milieuand to an intellectualenvironof his philosophical insight and of his greatness
ment neither exclusively English nor contemas a political thinker. (1961, p. 475)
porary.
By examiningHobbes's thought in this much
The hypothesis of interdependence asserts that
widercontext, Sabineshows how little a partisan
Hobbes really was and demonstrates that political thought arises out of, reflects, and is conHobbes'sthoughtwas to someextentconditioned strained and changed by political and social life; it
and limited not by his immediatepolitical en- also asserts the reverse. Consequently, histories
vironmentand alleged goals, but by the much that resemble the historical model provide the imwiderrangeof his experienceand knowledgeand portant-even if in some quarters controversialby the richstockof ideas, beliefs,andperspectives service of reminding students not to discount the
availableto him. Hobbes's theory is thus shown impact of political thought on behaviors and proto transcendits immediateenvironmentby virtue cesses. "This assumes, of course, that men's
of its breadth,depth, and ambitions;it is com- images of the world . . . affect the way they
parable neither to the thought of the ideologue behave (Sibley, 1970, p. 6), that political ideas and
nor to the typical thinkerof the time. Sabine is theories need to be taken into account when exdrawn to this judgment preciselyby examining plaining political conduct not because these ideas
Hobbes'sthoughtcontextually;for it is veryhard and theories "are true but because they are
to confuseHobbes, who set out to "makehis sys- believed" (Sabine, 1939, p. 10).
Exploration of this aspect of the hypothesis
tem broad enough to account, on scientificprintakes
a variety of related forms. For example, the
ciples, for all the facts of nature,includinghuman
behavior in its individual and social aspects," historian is likely to describe how ideas and ideolwith contemporarieswhose purposeswere exclu- ogies have in the past motivated actors by idensively partisanor whose writingswere less ambi- tifying for them political problems and possible
tious, less abstractand systematic,and less in- solutions, ends, and means. He will provide acformed by a variety of intellectual traditions counts of how ideas have generated or fueled conflict by legitimating or condemning particular
(1961, p. 457).
The reportingof an ideological dimensionin leaders or groups, movements, or institutions,
what are shown to be penetratingand lasting and by articulating and defending interests and
theoriesof politicscan serveto warnstudentsnot ideals. He will try to explain how popular beliefs
to confusedisciplinarydemandsfor methodologi- or systems of thought have provided criteria for
cal sophisticationand scientific objectivitywith defining political phenomena and frameworks
the absence of partisanship.Systematic,reflec- within which political reality was perceived,
tive, sustainedpolitical inquiryand the develop- meaningfully ordered, and acted upon. And he
ment of genuine political understandingand in- will describe how ideals characteristically funcsightare as muchthe productsof politicalinterest tioned as standards against which behaviors and
and concernsas of scientificmethod. Secondly, institutions were judged and how, sometimes,
political philosophiesare indeed shown to have they functioned also as goals toward which politilastingrelevancenot (simply)by abstractingthem cal decisions and actions were directed and so
from their historical contexts but, rather, by became embodied in institutions, laws, or
demonstratinghow a proper understandingof policies.
Although a familiarity with these arguments
those contexts helps account for their relative
and
accounts can be defended as contributing to
scarcity,lasting value, and persistentinfluence.5
Revertingto the exampleat hand, Hobbescan be political education on an individual basis, it is
their collective purpose or impact which must be
shown to have produced
stressed. All of them help the student to undera theorynaturalto anagewhich[giventheriseof
stand and explore the thesis that the character,
individualism]
sawthewreckof so manyof the
quality, and direction of political life is a function
traditionalassociationsand institutionsof
of the interplay between nature, habit, fortune,
economicandreligiouslifeandwhichsawabove
and autonomous social processes, and human
alltheemergence
of powerfulstatesin whichthe
thought,
purpose, and struggle. Given that this
makingof lawbecamethetypicalactivity.These
thesis is central to the study of politics-it is either
tendencies-theincreaseof legalpowerandthe
presupposed or examined by political scientists all
recognitionof self-interestas the dominant
the time-we should conclude that the historical
motivein life-have beenamongthe mostperhistory provides an important service by introvasiveinmoderntimes.ThatHobbesmadethem
the premisesof his systemand followedthem
ducing students to it.

'For relevant comments see Sabine (1953).

Finally, this history emphasizes the historical
nature of the objects and methods of political inquiry; that is, political life and thought and the
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methods and theories used to study them are
shaped by the past. I conclude my defense of this
model by arguing that an exposure to this kind of
historical understanding makes an especially important contribution to political education
because, although at one time it was widely taught
in the discipline, it is largely neglected today.6
Sabine (1906, p. 17) expressed this historical
understanding particularly well when he observed
that all things political (and indeed all things
human) do not merely have a history; they are historical. We did not, for example, invent our
political vocabularies ourselves; nor did we invent
our political practices, institutions, beliefs, and
theories; they are historical products, and understanding them even in rudimentary ways requires
knowing something about their histories, about
how they got here, and why they take the form
they do. Thus present-day meanings of liberalism
and Marxism, of freedom and justice, and of
citizenship and law, contain connotations and
associations that are historical in origin yet preserved in contemporary thought and dialogue.
Similarly, institutions and practices embody intentions, purposes, meanings, and ideals whose
development influences our current understanding and therefore our reactions to, participation
in, and evaluation of those institutions and practices. So, too, for instance, the absence or presence of beliefs and practices in given societies can
usually be explained only as the products of particular historical experiences and traditions, explanations that assume precisely the kind of historical understanding emphasized in the historical
history.
Political theories and methods are likewise historical creatures, inventions of men and women
familiar with certain historical experiences and
heirs of particular intellectual traditions. For instance, consider current theories that postulate,
after the fashion of modern economics, rational
self-interested behavior. This postulate is popular
partly because it appears reasonable, even
"natural," to thinkers who live in a culture that
has legitimized and reinforced calculating selfinterested behavior and also because, for the same
reason, it often facilitates explanation and prediction. Similarly, both the current interest in and
prevailing conceptions of explanation and prediction are historical products, in this case expressions of a rationalistic culture and of an evolving
6The importance for political science of the kind of
historical understanding I am describing here was often
stressed by earlier generations of political scientists, no
doubt because of the institutional and intellectual connections between political science and history characteristic of the discipline in its formative years. See as
examples Smith (1886) and Burgess (1897).
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conception of science dating at least to the seventeenth century.
The kind of understanding made familiar to
readers of the historical histories also demonstrates why their authors use a narrative style.
Because every present is shaped by its past, the
history of political thought must to some extent
be an unfolding story. It does not follow that
these histories reify a unitary tradition of Western
thought as some critics (e.g., Gunnell, 1979;
Pocock, 1962) have alleged; this criticism is best
directed elsewhere. Although these histories tell a
story, the critics forget that its structure is complex, that it embodies discontinuities as well as
continuities, and that it identifies the rise and fall
of multiple traditions operating at many levels of
experience. Consequently, the real weakness of
these studies is that they tax the very limits of
historical scholarship and for that reason need
constant revision. The point here has been to
argue that revisions ought to be welcomed, for
they also will demonstrate that political understanding must be informed by a sense of history
and by a historical sensibility.
The Traditional Model
The last two models reflect historiographies
devised by scholars who, writing during the heyday of behavioralism, feared that the study of
past political thought and theory was in danger of
extinction, and who therefore sought to demonstrate that the study of past political theory was
not an antiquarian exercise and tha(tthese theories
were not uninteresting or irrelevant by virtue of
their old age or alleged ethical, ideological, or
unscientific character.
The result was the construction of historiographies and histories that contended that, in the history of the West, certain political theories are
classics and that studying them is both relevant
and significant to the education of political scientists. The primary focus of these histories is therefore on the so-called classic political theories
rather than on the many levels of political thought
characteristic of the historical model. In addition,
a presupposition common to these histories is that
there are indeed identifiable classic or great
theories deserving of close attention and scrutiny.
These similarities notwithstanding, the histories
to which I allude are of two relatively distinct
sorts, the first of which is the traditional model.
What is especially distinctive about this model is
the claim that the classics constitute a great tradition of Western political theory or philosophy,
and the contention that this tradition is as important an object of inquiry and understanding as the
individual theories that purportedly constitute it.
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The foci of histories resembling this model, then,
are the classic theories and the great tradition, and
their objective is the critical analysis of both the
classics and the tradition, i.e., its historical
development.
Examples of works adopting these foci and objectives are the histories of Strauss (1953), Wolin
(1960), and Nelson (1982); in each the great tradition is understood not simply as a chronological
sequence of works and authors who share certain
similarities or affinities but as a relatively closeknit intellectual tradition whose participants were
conscious of and deeply concerned about their
predecessors, and each of whom sought to contribute to the development of political theory over
time. In other words, each contributed to an
evolving activity and, in the words of Wolin
(1960, p. 1) and Nelson (1982, p. 2) to "a tradition
of discourse."
Although not part of the model, these three histories also adopt certain substantive claims about
the tradition. These claims need to be identified
because they serve in these works as instrumental
justifications for the focus on the historical
development of the tradition. The central contention is that the tradition has in some important
senses declined over time. The basis of this judgment is essentially twofold: first, it is asserted that
political theory as traditionally conceived and
practiced has been lost or denigrated; in addition,
it is claimed that the more recent phases of the
tradition have had a negative impact on contemporary thought and practice by giving rise to certain practices and beliefs that are judged deficient
or harmful. The central justification for focusing
on the classics is therefore that the student will
come to understand (and perhaps be encouraged
to emulate) a now lost or denigrated, but valuable, way of doing systematic political thinking,
and the central justification for examining the historical development of the tradition is that the
student will come to understand why this sorry
state of affairs has come to pass.
Brief examples can help illuminate these
remarks. In the case of Strauss (1953, pp. 35-36),
a central position is that "political philosophers
from Plato to Hegel" all wrestled with the problem of "natural right"-i.e., with the proposition
that the discovery and justification of transhistorical standards of right or justice are possible.
Premodern, especially Greek, political philosophers defended this proposition; modern theorists
(after Aquinas) rejected it. On both philosophical and political grounds, Strauss favored the
Greek position and therefore characterized the
tradition of political theory as degenerative; it culminates in the rise of ethical relativism and the
death of political theory as traditionally practiced.
It is the demise of natural right and traditional
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political philosophy (or the rise of relativism and
positive social science) that Strauss identified as
the crux of our modern predicaments, practical as
well as intellectual. His critical analysis of the
classics and of the tradition was thus explicitly
designed to illuminate the origins and nature of
these predicaments and the superior arguments of
the pre-modern political theorists.
Wolin presents a somewhat parallel case. In his
view, traditional theorists sought "to identify and
define [the] truly political" and to defend the dignity, distinctiveness, and importance of the
political as that "order created to deal with those
concerns [common to all]" (1960, pp. 289, 9).
Since the seventeenth century, however, the
"vision of political theory has been a disintegrating one, constantly working to destroy the idea
that society ought to be considered as a whole and
that its general life was best expressed through
political forms" (1960, p. 430). This disintegration corresponds to, and is partly responsible for,
the disintegration and denigration of political life
in contemporary societies which Wolin refers to as
the "decline" and "sublimation" of "the political." Accordingly, he too characterizes the tradition in terms of a decline: the decline of traditional theory and of "the political." His history is
intended to explain the origins and characteristics
of these modern problems and, at the same time,
to disclose the "urgent task" of restoring the
traditional understanding of political theory "as
that form of knowledge which deals with what is
general and integrative" (1960, p. 434).
Although his history presents less of a narrative, Nelson also organizes his work around a particular theme, in this case around "the shifting
relationship of ethics and politics from the beginning of Western political thought to the present
time" (1982, p. 1). The historical development
portrayed is again one of decline, for the ancient
and medieval theorists rightly conceived of
politics as a moral activity, whereas modern theorists, beginning with Machiavelli, tended to sever
ethics from politics. Ideologies, asserted to be a
''response to the dilemmas arising out of the
modern divorce of ethics and politics," complete
the decline of the tradition, help to explain the
loss of traditional theory, and underscore the
"need" we have today "to devise political philosophies that unify ethics and politics" (1982, pp.
1-2, 332).
It is important to reiterate that the instrumental
justifications underlying these histories are explicitly tied to substantive concerns about presentday politics and political thought. A central goal
of these works is to indict or to question contemporary affairs, practices, or beliefs, and to identify a presumably valuable mode or activity of
political thinking that has been denigrated and
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lost. By disclosing in a critical fashion the different visions of the great theorists, for instance,
Wolin believes he is introducing students to ways
of conceiving political phenomena and of constructing political theories that are genuinely
unique and integrative while, at the same time,
exposure to these theories throws into sharp relief
the less worthy conceptions and modes of political
thinking and inquiry that characterize the present
day.
The central presuppositions underlying the
traditional model and these histories are therefore
quite obvious, and they have come in for a great
deal of methodological criticism in recent years.
First and foremost is the presupposition that there
exists an identifiable set of classic works, of
master political theorists, who engaged in substantially the same kind of activity or endeavor
despite their separation in time and space. Also
important are the presuppositions that these
authors are members of a tightly knit historical
tradition, and that this tradition has had and continues to have a substantial impact on thought
and practice.
Each of these presuppositions has been criticized by a number of writers, but most prominently by Pocock (1962, 1971, 1980), Dunn
(1968), and Skinner (1969), and by Gunnell (1978,
1979), who deplores more fully their supposition
that the classical theorists were members of a
unitary tradition is a myth. These authors also
charge that the idea that the tradition has been as
causally efficacious as asserted is an article of
faith for which there is little evidence. Finally, the
presuppositions that the masters were engaged in
a common activity, or that they commonly addressed some particular issue or problem, is also
rejeced by most or all of these critics.
A defense of the model would therefore seem to
require a defense of the presuppositions underlying it. Yet many of the criticisms levelled at
those histories that resemble the model seem to
me quite legitimate. The basic problem is that the
classic or great works do not in fact form a
unitary tradition in the manner presupposed by
the model. This is not to say that the masters were
not engaged in a common activity, a point to
which I return; rather the masters were not selfconsciously participating in a great dialogue or
tradition whose contours can be presented in
terms of a coherent narrative and whose meaning
and import prove causally relevant to contemporary events and intellectual fashions. To discuss
the putative tradition in this way is to endow it
with the sorts of properties that we legitimately
ascribe to, say, the nineteenth-century utilitarian
tradition in Britain. And this, as Gunnell and the
others argue, is a mistake: "What is presented as a
historical tradition is in fact basically a retrospec-
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tive analytical construction which constitutes a
rationalized version of the past" (Gunnell, 1979,
p. 70).
To label the tradition a myth is not, however, to
undermine altogether the traditional model. As
Gunnell makes clear, historians and other
scholars can legitimately identify "certain similarities and differences in a range of chronologically ordered works and speak of this as a tradition with continuity and change" (1979, p. 85).
Of course this presupposes that the similarities
identified are not themselves invented or mythic,
and here Gunnell appears to part company with
the other critics mentioned, and especially with
Pocock. Gunnell seems to believe that the classic
works actually share certain important similarities, so that a critical focus on them can be justified on pedagogical grounds. He appears in fact
to accept the very Wolin-like position that the
classics creatively engage "the problem of political order and that, in terms of their content and
the circumstances of their production, they bear
certain family resemblances, and possess certain
common motifs, which make it reasonable to construct a paradigm of political theory and the
political theorist to which specific works conform
in varying degrees" (1979, p. 136).
According to Pocock (1980, pp. 566-567), however, Gunnell's position merely replicates the
errors of the traditional model, except of course
that in Gunnell's version the classical theorists
"do not constitute a [historical] tradition any
more." For Pocock, rejecting the myth of the
tradition is not enough; one must also reject the
myth of the masters, i.e., the supposition that
they can, without historical distortion, be treated
as species of the same genus. In what follows I defend Gunnell, and so the traditional model as corrected or modified, against Pocock.
The somewhat complicated position I adopt is
that the traditional model is in some ways deficient, but that certain central features of it deserve
our support. With respect to deficiencies, the
model errs in two fundamental ways: it ascribes to
the great tradition a historical specificity and
coherence that the tradition does not possess, and
it ascribes to this tradition a causal impact on past
and contemporary events and thought it never
had. The first error can be easily rectified by following Gunnell's suggestion that the tradition be
understood, and be explicitly presented to students as, an analytical construct. The second error
needs simply to be admitted and no longer
repeated. Although we can not and should not
ignore the influence particular masters had on
subsequent members of the tradition, it should be
obvious that if we want to provide a historical
account of past and contemporaneous practices
and beliefs, we simply cannot "concentrate on the
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received canon of classic texts" (Skinner, 1974, p.
280). We must instead adopt something like the
historiography embodied in the historical model.
At the same time, however, we need to recognize the legitimacy and pedagogical utility of the
traditional history. In the first place, there is
nothing wrong or untoward with using the tradition, conceived as an analytical construct, as a
device through which scholars present and examine significant political or theoretical issues such
as the problem of ethical relativism, the meaning,
boundaries, and importance of "the political," or
the relationship between politics and ethics. We
can use the tradition in this way because the
masters did, as a matter of historical fact, speak
to these issues. They often addressed the question
of moral standards, they certainly examined the
nature and importance of politics, and they
typically considered the relationship between
politics and ethics. It is true that they did not do
only these things, and it is true that they did not
all think that these or any other specific issues
were of equal importance or were even of central
concern. But the traditional model need not deny
these truths, and a fair reading of traditional histories indicates that they do not deny them either.
A second justification of the traditional history
is that treating the classics as exemplars of a valuable activity and submitting them to a process of
critical analysis serves to engage the student in
political thinking. To repeat, the behavioral
movement within political science led to a renewed emphasis on the importance of establishing
the direct relevance of the study of the history of
political thought. In many cases this meant shifting attention or emphasis from the history of
political thought to the study of political theory.
Essentially what was claimed was that the great
theories must be directly relevant to political education because they were and are, after all, recognized classics. All of the justificatory arguments
that followed from this premise necessarily
assumed that the so-called classics deserved their
title. Did they? Do they?
In a general but important sense they surely do.
A classic is anything of recognized worth or excellence. As such, the term is honorific, and it is conventionally applied only to historical artifacts that
have through time been influential or revered or
both. The contention, then, was and is that in the
history of the West certain works and authors
Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas,
Machiavelli and Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau,
Hegel and Marx, and a few others-have been
remarkably influential (as compared to lesser
writers) and often revered. The historical evidence
for this claim, including the fact that educated
people in this century continue to read these
authors, is so overwhelming that, in the general
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sense described, the assumption is justified.
But if we ask why these works and authors are
classics-if, that is to say, we seek an explanation
for their persistence and honorific status-disputes are possible, and the assignment of individual works and authors to the category can
become uncertain and controversial (see, e.g.,
Sanderson, 1968). In the histories of the 1950s and
1960s, however, there was considerable agreement. Two qualities are most often ascribed to the
classics in order to explain their lasting value and
attractiveness, first that the classics raise the fundamental or the perennial questions and problems
of politics, and second that they embody insightful, comprehensive theories or visions of politics.
Complete agreement on what precisely "comprehensiveness" means is absent from these histories, but there is some consensus. In general,
comprehensiveness refers to three characteristics
of the classics which they all meet to some extent.
First, these theories embrace normative and practical as well as descriptive and explanatory concerns. Second, they often include or reflect
philosophical positions and theories, such as an
epistemology and metaphysic, worked out by
their authors. Third, these theories consider in
thoughtful and typically systematic ways a wide
variety of phenomena and issues that can enhance
political understanding and yet are not narrowly
political-human nature and its bearing on collective existence, the place of ethics and education in
political life, and the relationships between politics and culture, religion, and economics, are
some standard examples.
Explaining the historical persistence and
honorific status of the masters in this way supports the further claim that they, at some not-tooabstract a level, were involved in the same activity.
They all constructed-more or less successfully,
depending on cases and judges-comprehensive
theories, and they all addressed the perennial
issues of politics; indeed, these theories can be
legitimately read as if they constitute responses to,
or engagements with, the fundamental or timeless
(and not merely timely) political problems. If this
is so, histories that identify, elucidate, and discuss
critically these perennial issues are eminently justifiable, eminently relevant; and this is precisely
the position taken by the perennial-issues model,
a model I discuss and defend below.
The traditional model also discusses the perennial issues; in fact, histories resembling this model
typically organize their critical analyses of the
classic theories around one of these perennial
issues (e.g., around the relationship between
ethics and politics) as we have seen. But the traditional history also emphasizes the comprehensiveness of the classics. The claim is that it is especially this feature and not just the confrontation with
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particular perennial issues which makes the
classics so valuable. To recover these comprehensive theories or visions, to understand how they
were put together or fashioned whole, and to
assess critically the claims and perspectives they
advanced are, in the traditional model, rightfully
seen as contributions to political education, as invitations to modes of political thinking or theorizing in which students can participate.
Before amplifying this additional argument for
the traditional model, let me make clear my opposition to Pocock's position. Pocock denies, while
I wish to affirm, that the classics are exemplars of
a certain broadly conceived kind of intellectual
activity that issues in comprehensive theories of
politics. This is not simply or largely a retrospective analytical construction; it is rather a reasonably accurate factual claim, an eminently plausible interpretation of the historical evidence, primarily of the texts in question. It helps explain
why the classics have persisted as objects of interest and often of respect, and explains as well
why the emphatically contextual research undertaken by historians such as Pocock has not undermined this position. Of course I cannot prove this
contention here, but if we grant at least some
validity to it, a good case can be made for an additional justificatory argument for the traditional
histories. Very briefly I make this case by explaining what a critical analysis of the classics-conceived as comprehensive theories of politics
involves.
This instrumental defense focuses on the process of critical analysis through which the historian or scholar seeks to "understand," and to
"evaluate" or "assess," the classics. Exactly what
this process substantively demonstrates will of
course vary from historian to historian because
different historians will entertain somewhat different conceptions of what the classics are or what
the masters did; they will emphasize or select different aspects or features of the theories examined, sometimes examine different writings of the
same theorist, will use different standards of criticism, and will sometimes use different techniques
or rules of interpretation.
Despite these differences in preconceptions,
emphases, selection, standards, and techniques,
I want to argue that the process of critical analylsis in all cases offers students the opportunity to
participate in political thinking. This can be briefly explained by pointing out that critical analysis
demands of the historian analytic, synthetic, and
critical skills. Analysis and synthesis require that
the historian disassemble into constitutive parts
the theories examined and that he explain how the
parts, such as premises, definitions, preferences,
and criticisms, are interconnected to form comprehensive wholes. It is this process that helps to
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produce an understanding of the theories examined for both historian and student. But more important, it involves the reader, as it involves the
historian, in political thinking. For example, in
the effort to achieve understanding, the historian
may be required to describe how a particular
theorist defines and defends a particular conception of liberty or of human nature; then to explain
how this conception relates to a particular argument about the desirability of or need for constitutional or absolute government; and finally to
show how this argument fits and functions in the
broader theory. Understanding and therefore
political thinking are further enhanced by comparing the theories examined to one another,
comparisons invited by conceiving each theory as
instances of a common activity.
Creativity is involved in this process because the
historian must illuminate, classify, and connect
arguments and themes he feels are important and
need attention. Perhaps the historian will invent
abstract categories in order to highlight and
analyze themes in theories which he feels might
otherwise be missed or not fully appreciated.
(Consider, for instance, Wolin's (1960) use of the
categories "political space" and "time.") Or perhaps the historian will use suggestive labels in
order to illuminate allegedly central arguments or
themes in the works of particular theorists, as
Strauss (1953, pp. 168, 193) does when he identifies Hobbes as "the creator of political hedonism" and Hobbes's theory as "the first philosophy of power." In these ways the historian introduces students to a new vocabulary and to different ways of thinking about political ideas,
phenomena, and problems.
Understanding a theory also involves, and is
enhanced by, critical reflection; this typically includes describing the supposed implications of
concepts, propositions, or arguments found in a
theory, and sometimes of the entire theory, for
practice or for thought, and assessing these implications, and the theory and its parts, in terms
of (for example) their supposed cogency, plausibility, novelty, justifiability, desirability, validity,
truth, or falsity. Wolin's (1960, ch. 2) critique of
Plato's political outlook as essentially antipolitical and Nelson's (1982, p. 43) cautious appreciation of Plato's "disturbing picture of
democratic man," are examples. In these ways the
historian as critic adds critical commentary as well
as content to the theories examined, enlarging and
enhancing the reader's comprehension of them
and, at the same time, offering readers the opportunity to think critically about political concepts
and arguments, relationships and possibilities.
This (second) defense of the traditional history
can be summarized by saying that the critical
analysis of the classics is itself an exercise in
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political thinking or theorizing, an exercise controlled by the textual and other historical evidence
available to the historian but not reducible to that
evidence. Although it is true that this benefit is
accorded the historian especially, the point here is
that readers will be led to share in this activity. Exposure to the classics is in this sort of history a
way of teaching students how to think analytically, systematically, and critically about political
ideas, perspectives, and problems.
This defense is not mine; some version of it is
explicitly made, typically in introductory comments, in most of these histories in order to
strengthen the justificatory claim of relevance.
Although some will fault this approach to past
political theory on the ground that it inevitably
leads to historical inaccuracies and distortions, I
have tried to argue that such a charge is not only
suspect (because the classics can bear these sorts
of analyses), but also misses (or dismisses) the
pedagogical utility of this approach for students
of politics and political theory.
The Perennial-Issues Model
When he turns to the writing of a history, the
perennial-issues historian focuses on the "timeless" political problems and issues in the classic
texts. He thus presupposes both that there exist
certain "enduring questions of politics," and that
the study of the masters is particularly well suited
to the task of ferreting out those questionsbecause, it is said, these theorists, unlike lesser
political thinkers, "concentrated their attention
on general principles." This is the position of
Andrew Hacker, whose history (1961, pp. 17, ix)
is prototypic of the perennial-issues model. Approximations to the model include Plamenatz
(1963) and Bluhm (1965).
This historian's first objective, then, is to identify for students the eternal or persistent political
problems, questions, issues, or even approaches
to political inquiry found in the classics. He has,
however, a second objective. Recognizing that
discussions of these issues by the masters is often
submerged in historically specific concerns, the
historian tries to demonstrate that these discussions can be made applicable to contemporary
political study or political life. This second objective requires another presupposition: that the historian can legitimately update or even reinterpret
the ideas or arguments of the masters in order to
make their language more familiar to students and
their arguments more relevant for dealing with
today's world.
Because the perennial-issues historian includes
in his history only the masters, his work may be
confused with that of the traditional history.
There are, however, differences between the two.
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For one thing, the perennial-issues historian is less
interested in elucidating the nature of political
theory conceived as a complex or comprehensive
activity and more interested in using the classics to
identify the "perennial problems," the timeless
"ideas and assumptions," or "the universal
ideas" contained or embodied in them (Bluhm,
1965, p. 13; Hacker, 1961, p. 23; Plamenatz,
1963, p. x). Additionally, he is not interested in
discussing the tradition of political theory and its
supposed development; on the contrary, he explicitly eschews such an interest (Bluhm, especially pp. 14-15; Hacker, ch. 1; Plamenatz, especially
pp. vi, ix-x). Finally, he is not interested in using
the tradition to bring into focus some fairly
specific contemporary problem or predicament
such as the demise of natural right or the decline
of the political. Rather, he wants to demonstrate
how the many perennial problems, issues, ideas,
and approaches to political inquiry explicit or implicit in the classics may be brought up to date and
used to elucidate better contemporary political life
and inquiry.
The pursuit of these objectives in the perennialissues histories is of course intended to guarantee
their relevance, to justify instrumentally the study
of past political theory. More specifically, Hacker
(1961, especially pp. vii-viii) argues that his approach will illuminate for students important
(because perennial) political problems and ideas
and in that way help to build a bridge between the
study of past theories and the contemporary study
of politics. Plamenatz (1963, especially p. xi)
argues that his history will help students "look
carefully at the assumptions they make and the
ideas they use" because it is just such assumptions
and ideas that the masters articulated and examined. In addition, Bluhm (1965, ch. 1) contends
that his work will help students better understand
approaches to the study of, and perspectives on,
contemporary politics, because contemporary approaches and perspectives resemble in significant
ways the approaches and perspectives found in
the classics.
Because these instrumental defenses are quite
straightforward and these histories (rather like the
traditional histories) have been the object of
numerous methodological critiques, I shall
assume that the defense of this model requires
primarily a defense of the two main presuppositions underlying it. The important queries here
are: Do there exist timeless political problems?
Can the task of bringing meaning up to date be
defended?
The claim that there exist timeless political
problems presupposes that there are inherent in all
forms of political life problems that transcend
time. As soon as we identify such a problem, we
commit ourselves to the view that there are certain
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ideas or concepts that are (to some degree) timeless. For example, if we say that "What is
politics?" is a perennial question, we commit ourselves to the view that politics is a timeless concept. Only if we accept this premise can we say,
for instance, that when Aristotle raised this question, he meant by it something akin to what we
mean by it. This does not, of course, commit us to
the view that the term "politics" never changes its
meaning; on the contrary, we expect thinkers
separated by time and space to define politics
somewhat differently. Nevertheless, it does commit us to the view that the term in some respects
never changes its meaning.
When radical historicists reject the contention
that there exist timeless political problems or
questions, they are committed to another view.7
They suppose that a concept is individuated by its
meaning, so that whenever a concept undergoes a
change in meaning, it becomes a new concept (see
Fain, 1970, ch. 2). They might argue, for instance,
that since the Greek term for politics meant something peculiarly Greek, it cannot be supposed that
the term has anything in common with ours, or
that when Aristotle raised the question, "What is
politics?" he was doing what we do when we raise
the question.
Although I do not propose to resolve philosophical riddles concerning the nature of concepts, I wish to argue that the radical historicist
view is self-defeating when applied to historical
research. In particular, I want to suggest that the
position of the radical historicist is, in two ways,
radically ahistorical. First there can be, on the
radical historicist account, no such thing as the
history of "an idea"-such as the history of the
idea of politics or, for that matter, a history of
Western political theory-because the radical historicist would have us choose between two options: either ideas are individuated by their meaning, or ideas never change their meaning. The latter option is, of course, historically absurd; it
would make history impossible. If, for example,
the idea of politics never changed its meaning,
there could be no history of this idea to tell.

"Ihave in mind Collingwood, Passmorc, and Skinner.
Collingwood rejected the view that there were timeless
philosophical ideas in his Autobiography, as discussed
by Passmore (1965, pp. 5-13). As Passmore points out,
however, Collingwood also claimed that an exception to
the radical historicity of thought might be political
philosophy, a point on which Passmore also agrees.
Skinner (1969), focusing specifically on political
thought, transposes Collingwood's view on philosophy
to political philosophy, although in the final analysis
even Skinner is somewhat ambiguous on this point (in
the 1969 article). A radical historicist position was also
adopted by Lamprecht (1939).
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The former option, however, produces the
same result: if the idea of politics is individuated
by its meaning, whenever the meaning changes the
idea changes and, therefore, "there is no history
of the idea to be written" (Skinner, 1969, p. 38).
We could, on this radical historicist account, produce "a history of the various statements made
with the given expression"; but this would not be
a history of the idea, because ideas, unlike expressions or words, are individuated by their meaning.
Writing a "history" (?) of the expression
"politics" would, of course, be an "absurdly
ambitious enterprise"; but, says the radical historicist, "it would at least be conceptually
proper" (1969, p. 39).
Second, the position of the radical historicistif taken literally-makes historical interpretation
impossible. If historically distant or alien
languages share nothing in common with our
own, it is hard to see, as Dilthey (1962, p. 77) once
suggested, how interpretation could take place:
"Interpretation," he remarked, "would be impossible if expressions of life were completely
strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing
strange were in them. It lies, therefore, between
these two extremes" (see also Wiener, 1961). If
there is no similarity between Aristotle's conception of politics and our own, how could we say
anything about his conception; indeed, how could
we discover that he had any conceptions at all?
Unless the historian is prepared to assume that
there are some similarities, some resemblances,
between his language and that of his subjects,
historical interpretation must be given up and historical understanding must be considered impossible. It is doubtful that the radical historicist
means to commit himself to such a position; and
this helps to explain why Skinner had ultimately
to retreat from the position just described (see
Skinner, 1974).
There is, however, a related position that is
both more common and reasonable, that of the
historicist who fears that, in making the necessary
assumption that the thought of the past shares
something in common with the thought of the
present, the historian will exaggerate these similarities and so fall into the trap of anachronism.
Failure to take seriously the historicity of human
thought and life may very well produce anachronistic interpretations and erroneous descriptions of past action or purpose. This danger is
surely always present; it in no way follows, however, that this is necessarily a "bad" thing. Historians who turn to the past because of presentday concerns or interests may actually produce
"good" history, by which I mean bring to our
attention themes or dimensions in historical subjects or texts previously neglected or overlooked
-and this because of their present-minded con-
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cerns or orientation. Leslie (1970), supporting her
case with some insightful examples, has argued
precisely this point.
It is also important to recognize that the alleged
danger of anachronism is easily exaggerated, since
exactly what constitutes an anachronistic interpretation is at least sometimes difficult to say. It
may, for instance, be anachronistic to call Plato
and Rousseau "totalitarians," but is it anachronistic to call attention to those features of their
thought that remind us of totalitarianism? The
same difficulty affects the issue of "timeless"
problems or questions. Although the current
problems of conservation and resource management are indeed contemporary, the problematic
relationship between man and nature has been a
persistent concern throughout human history.
Similarly, although the question of the appropriate role of technocrats in decision making may be
contemporary, the question concerning who
should rule seems to be timeless; the point, of
course, is that answers to the contemporary query
can be approached on the basis of answers given
to the timeless query (or, if one prefers, the contemporary query is a version of the timeless one).
It needs also to be pointed out that perennialissues historians cannot usually be accused of unwittingly making anachronistic interpretations,
because they often admit to doing so. When the
perennial-issues historian tries to bring the
language up to date and make applicable the ideas
and arguments of the classics, he is often fully
aware that he is doing so and that he may, in the
process, be distorting to some extent historical
truth (e.g., Hacker, 1961, p. 16). Only intellectual
historians outside the discipline' seem (or in the
past seemed) to miss this obvious point; those
within recognize that when a perennial-issues history is written by a political scientist, the author is
out to save the study of past theory from feared
extinction (as evidenced in Hacker, 1954, and
Bluhm, 1962).
But one question does remain: Is the (typically
explicit) objective of bringing meaning up to date
legitimate? The answer seems obvious. As Hirsch
(1972) has pointed out, all interpretive objectives
are "ontologically equal" in the straightforward
sense that there simply is no one interpretive goal
or strategy sanctioned by divinity, logic, necessity,
or any other authoritative ground. If the interpretive objective of the perennial-issues historian
"In particular by Skinner (1969) who presupposes
what is false: that the objective of the historical study of
past thinkers is always the same-namely, the attempt
to achieve historically "accurate" interpretations. He
thus attacks Hacker on methodological grounds several
times in the course of this essay, completely ignoring
Hacker's objectives.
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is justifiable on pedagogical grounds it is, therefore, legitimate.
Consequently, the only remaining way to critique the perennial-issues model is to attack not
the objectives animating it but the justification
underlying it. Two such objections, related yet
distinguishable, can be identified, and both have
been raised by Wolin, who once argued against
this sort of history that:
What seems to have been forgottenis that one
readspast theories,not becausethey are familiar
... but becausethey are strangeand therefore
provocative.If [for instance]Aristotleis readas
the first behavioralist,what he has to say is only'
of antiquarianinterestand it would be far more
profitableto read our contemporaries.(1969, p.
1077)
The first objection raised here is that bringing
the ideas of past theorists up to date misses their
real significance, which is their "strangeness."
This objection cannot, on reflection, be sustained. If achieving supposedly accurate interpretations of the thought of political theorists is
worthwhile for contemporary students of politics,
it must be because their thought is in some sense
relevant. Now by "relevance" Wolin means their
ability to provoke thought-a worthy, yet nonetheless present-minded, justification. If Aristotle
could not provoke thought today, he would be
found, presumably, irrelevant. But if one type of
relevance can justify the sort of historical approach apparently favored by Wolin, surely
another type of relevance can justify the approach
favored by the perennial-issues historian. If
Aristotle can be unfamiliar yet provocative, he
can also be made familiar because provocative.
Wolin's second objection seems more telling.
This objection is that the effort to make applicable or directly relevant the discussions and arguments of the masters puts the perennial-issues
historian in the odd position of saying what could
be said more economically or at least more directly. If, for example, the point of studying Aristotle
is to launch into a discussion of modern behavioralism, why bother with Aristotle? Or if the point
of studying Machiavelli is to launch into a discussion of modern theories of elitism, why not dispense with Machiavelli and deal with Pareto and
Mosca?' The answer is actually quite simple: the
perennial-issues historian does not focus on
Machiavelli only to talk about theories of elitism.
Machiavelli's ideas and arguments are relevant in
numerous other ways; for instance, one might
also find such directly relevant or applicable ideas
9Hacker (1961) uses Aristotle and Machiavelli in these
ways; but see note 10.
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as the meaning of political realism and meansend-analyses; the iron law of oligarchy; the tension between ethics and politics; the significance
of religious belief for political order; the doctrine
of raison d'etat; various democratic ideas and
problems; a cyclical theory of political change;
perspectives on the limits of power; and political
psychology.'0 For the perennial-issues historian,
the thought of the "great" theorists opens an
apparently unlimited storehouse of "relevant"
ideas "which stimulate the mind and inspire the
imagination" (Hacker, 1961, p. 19).
Conclusion
I have tried to defend three historiographical
models, each representing a different approach to
the study of past political ideas and theories,
against the objections outlined in the first section
of this article. Against the claim that historicist
approaches are too past-minded to be of use or
significance, I argue that histories using a historiography similar to that described by the historical model can on the contrary expose and sensitize students to a broad spectrum of important
ideas. Examples include developing in students a
sensitivity to the diversity of forms of political life
and thought, and to the contestability of major
political concepts and ideals; an awareness of the
complex interrelationships between political
thought and political practice; and an appreciation for the historical nature of political thought,
inquiry, and practice.
Against the more general criticism that the
study of past political theories is antiquarian, I
have maintained that the process of historical
interpretation requires creative and sustained
forms of political analysis and reflection, that
interpretation is not equivalent to mere description or re-description. I have also pointed out that
the critical analysis of theories enables students to
recover a way of thinking about collective or
political existence which is unfamiliar, comprehensive, and often insightful; ,and that such
analyses can contribute to the development of students' analytical, synthetic, and critical skills.
Finally, I argue that the perennial-issues history
provides a direct, and anything but antiquarian,
service to the student of politics by identifying and
elucidating themes and problems explicitly considered, or implicitly contained, in certain old
texts that nevertheless remain very much alive in
contemporary political inquiry, thought, and
practice.

'"These are some of the "relevant" ideas besides elitism that Hacker (1961) finds in Machiavelli.
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